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In order to cope with the various types of cyber-attacks in the Internet, several methods of 
tracking the source of attack have been developed. However, until recently, most of them are 
defensive security methods rather than preventive one. In order to settle the Bright Internet, 
which is still in its early stage, it is necessary to establish a technical source tracking method. For 
this, a standard and evaluation criteria are needed to determine which technology would be 
appropriate for the Bright Internet requirements. In this paper, we classify cyber-attack source 
traceback technologies and derive some criteria for the evaluation of the technologies for the 
Bright Internet. Using the criteria, we can evaluate existing traceback technologies from the 
perspective of the Bright Internet. In this article, we try to evaluate SAVA, PPM, iTrace, 
Controlled flooding, Input Debugging, Central Track, IPSec, SPIE(Hash-based), and 
Marking+Logging methods. Based on this research, future research will require in-depth 
verification of traceback technologies that reflects all the principles of the Bright Internet in 
practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the World Economic Forum (2016), one of the top ten risks likely to occur 
over the next decade is a cyber-attack. The analysis also suggests that cyber-crime will be more 
harmful in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, where the world is connected via the 
Internet of Things and many intelligent technologies and applications are provided. In the era of 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, an efficient cyber-attack sources tracking method should be 
provided for the social security. In particular, research on the tracking the source of cyber-attack 
has been carried out as a countermeasure or a tracking method for a specific attack such as 
DDoS(Distributed Denial of Service) by using the existing security technologies. As the scale 
and methods of cyber-attacks have been diversified, it becomes more difficult to track the source 
because attackers have been struggling to hide their locations by using various methods. Kim et 
al. (2014) defined the cyber-target attack tracing technology as a technology that can track the 
location of the actual hacker, that is, the origin of the attack, even if the location of the attacking 
system and the location of the hacker attempting to actually hack are different. Recently, it has 
evolved into a form of controlling a zombie PC by installing a proxy server or a server in a cloud 
environment where it is hard to track the exact source location. Therefore, techniques for 
tracking the location of an attacker have been actively researched and proposed. 
Ultimately, the next generation of the Internet should be safer and more reliable not only 
high-speed (Lee, 2015). In order to realize this, the Bright Internet was suggested by AIS society 
to fundamentally suppress the cause of crime (Lee, 2016a). The five principles of the Bright 
Internet are: Principle of Origin Responsibility, Principle of Deliverer Responsibility, Principle 
of Identifiable Anonymity, Principle of Global Collaborative Search, and Principle of Privacy 
Protection. In this study, we focus on Principle of Origin Responsibility, Principle of Deliverer 
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Responsibility, and Principle of Identifiable Anonymity among five principles of the Bright 
Internet. In this study, we classify the traceback technologies and try to evaluate them from the 
Bright Internet point of view. Based on the evaluation, we can improve existing technologies by 
securing transparency and preventing cybercrime and the decision makers can develop cost-
effective technology and applications.  
 
This study, after describing the background of the research and the purpose of the 
research, Section 2 sets the goal of this study through previous research and literature reviews on 
existing cyber-attack source traceback technologies and the Bright Internet. And after classifying 
the existing traceback technology and classification criteria, we try to evaluate each technology 





2.1. Traceback of Cyber-attack Source 
Savage (2000) evaluated each IP traceback technologies. This study evaluated the features of 
each traceback methods based on the overhead and basic functions of them. Murugesan (2014) 
also conducted a qualitative evaluation using the features of each technology using the IP 
traceback technologies to cope with DDoS attacks. This study provided more detailed reasons 
and evidences for the requirements of traceback. For the classification of the technolgies, Han 
(2008) classified the traceback technologies according to connection method, response method 
and application method. The connection method is divided into a TCP traceback method, which 
is a connection oriented communication method, and an IP traceback method, which is a non-
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connection oriented communication method. The response method is classified into a passive 
traceback method that tracks the location of an attacker using traces left in the attacked victim 
system, and an active traceback method that actively restricts hacking attempts themselves. In 
addition, the network-based traceback method and the host-based traceback method are classified 
according to the location of the traceback module in the communication. Each method was 
broadly categorized based on technical commonalities. The detailed evaluation of each method is 
required. Huirong et al. (2008) evaluated whether it satisfies the agreement in ITU-T SG17 
standardization meeting in 2008. They evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of each 
technology by using the common technical features of each method. The criteria of each item 
were classified in an overly detailed manner, and it evaluated them with narrow technical 
viewpoints. 
  In a broader perspective, an agreed study of cyber-attack source traceback was done by 
Kim et al. (2014). Classification of backtracking technology is largely divided into layer, IP, 
TCP and backtracking at application stage, and each technology is classified by the method using 
common technical breakpoints at each stage. It is similar to the previous study in that it uses 
technological commonality rather than a consistent classification, but it is more developed in that 
it classifies backtracking technologies into a wider range. 
  In addition, there are many cases in which the technical commonality of the layer and 
the case of preventive or countermeasures are distinguished in classification basically in 
domestic and foreign studies. For the evaluation items, the backtracking method was diversified, 
and the evaluation of each detail item by the preceding studies was performed, and the 
technologies were evaluated with relatively subdivided items. Most of the criteria were based on 
technical similarities and differences except for some items.  
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In Figure 1, we classified the traceback technologies into subdivided stages of 
classification, response, approach, and actual applications. 
 
 
[Figure 1] Traceback technologies classification 
 
 
2.2. Bright Internet 
In the IoT era, where all things are connected by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
existing cyber problems will occur on a large and diverse scale, including human casualties. 
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Therefore, efforts to resolve the side effects in the Internet structure are necessary and a security 
paradigm with a preventive dimension has been proposed (Lee, 2015). Bright Internet 
preemptively reduces the origins of cyber security threats by having the ability to identify 
malicious sources and forwarders globally while maintaining the legitimate level of privacy for 
anonymous expression and innocent netizen. The Bright Internet presented five principles to 
realize the cause of provider responsibility: Principle of Origin Responsibility, Principle of 
Deliverer Responsibility, Principle of Identifiable Anonymity, Principle of Global Collaborative 
Search, and Principle of Privacy Protection. In a recent study by Shin et al. (2017) regarding the 
Bright Internet, it is said that it is difficult to prevent the threat of the state-led cyber terrorism, 
where the Internet is used as a weapon, only by the five principles of Bright Internet. In order to 
compensate this, The Internet Peace Principle is added. Lee et al. (2017) provided basic 
technology requirements for the implementation of the Bright Internet. 
 
 
EVALUATION CRITERIA FROM THE BRIGHT INTERNET PERSPECTIVE 
 
This study tries to evaluate each technology from the Bright Internet viewpoint. In this study, 
we selected three principles of ‘Origin Responsibility’, ‘Deliverer Responsibility’, ‘Identifiable 
Anonymity’ among the principles of the Bright Internet. We evaluate 'Source traceability', 
'Waypoint traceability’, 'Possibility of identifiable anonymity' in order to evaluate the technology 
based on the three principles. There are costs and administrative considerations to actually use th 
e IP traceback technology for implementing the Bright Internet. Therefore, in this study, 
measures of the management aspect are introduced as 'ease of application', 'development cost', 
'maintenance cost', and 'conversion cost'. In addition, the proactive of cyber-attacks or preventive 
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one is an important factor of the cyber-attack from the Bright Internet point of view. Based on 
the above, the evaluation results of existing technologies are shown as bellow; 
 
(1) Source traceability (Origin Responsibility) 
   The criteria for source traceability were evaluated based on the principle of origin 
responsibility. This is most closely related to the traceback accuracy in the previous traceback 
technology evaluation researches and is described based on the previous studies. 
 
(2) Waypoint traceability (Deliverer Responsibility) 
   It evaluates technologies on the basis of whether the accuracy of the confirmation of the 
waypoint of the attack is secured. It seems to be vulnerable if the information of each router is 
distorted when it constructs traceback using Central Track and IPSec(Internet Protocol Security) 
-based Tunnel. An Application-based traceback method has a big difference in the accuracy of 
checking the waypoint between the technologies. 
   The SPIE(Source Path Isolation Engine) has high accuracy of the waypoint checking because 
it is based on the Hash method. Controlled Flooding and Input Debugging traceback 
technologies are relatively reliable because they check the source while monitoring the traffic. In 
case of SAVA(Source Address Validation Architecture) method, because the validity of origin 
address is judged step by step, so it is easy to check the waypoint. 
 
(3) Possibility of Identifiable Anonymity 
  An anonymity in the Bright Internet can be interpreted as a part about whether the original 
location and address can be confirmed at the time of traceback while ensuring the anonymity in 
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usual cases. In the case of iTrace and PPM among the traceback methods using the packet, it is 
difficult to control the intermediate stages because the traceback route can be reconfigured by 
gathering a plurality of packets. In addition, the application-based traceback method itself has 
difficulty in anonymizing the whole because it forms a path by using various information in 
addition to the IP packet information. 
  Since the SPIE traceback technology uses a single packet, the possibility of anonymity cannot 
be ruled out. In the case of IPSec, it is highly possible to implement the anonymity that can be 
verified when reconfiguring cases in a tunnel of routers within an IPSec connection. SAVA 
configures encryption with peer-to-peer when determining the validity of an address, thus it 
provides the identifiable anonymity. 
 
(4) Ease of application 
It might be required to install some hardware or software to apply the technology. An ideal 
technology might be implemented easily in ISP or etc. without change of the network structure. 
Except iTrace, the other traceback technologies cannot support packet display and logging in the 
current router. It is easy to apply because it uses ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol). 
SAVA has low application possibility because it needs pre-negotiation between inter-AS. An 
overlay-based method can be applied only in a specific network. It cannot be applied in the 
general network environment where the structure of routers are changing dynamically. 
 
(5) Development cost 
   Development costs are measured in terms of the initial costs incurred when building a new 
cyber-attack source traceback technology. It is necessary to consider the scalability of the 
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development cost during the technology introduction stage. In case of PPM with marking 
method, it is a simple technology among them. In addition, the PPM and iTrace traceback 
technologies are scalable because they require a traceback module for packet marking on routers 
in the network. 
   However, SAVA traceback technology requires a switch on the Access Network to be 
upgraded when applying a switch-based solution, and can be deployed between the host and the 
terminating router as a signature-based solution. It needs additional costs to insert and validate 
the signatures. It is also necessary to consider the additional costs and equipment costs of 
distributing and certifying the credentials. 
 
(6) Maintenance cost 
  Maintenance cost is the expense to maintain it after introducing an traceback technology. 
Basically, the maintenance cost is high, which is high in management overhead. iTrace is 
characterized by low management overhead and stable message output in the event of a problem 
with intermediate routers. 
  In the case of PPM, the overhead of management is low, but when the number of attack 
packets increases, the cost for performance improvement may increase. It also has a lot of 
protection in backtracking compared to a logging-based approach. In addition, IPSec-based 
traceback technology might be expensive to manage communication tunnels. 
  Of the traceback technologies that take the traffic monitoring method, the Input Debugging 
has high management overhead for import and export, but the Controlled Flooding has relatively 
less overhead for management. 
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(7) Conversion cost 
  The conversion cost is measured in terms of the cost incurred when a new change is made in 
the existing cyber-attack prevention technology. iTrace and PPM traceback technology do not 
require ISP coordination. In the case of PPM, since it adopts the marking method, gradual 
installation may be possible. 
  Since the SPIE traceback method requires DGA (Data Generation Agents) to be installed on 
all routers for backtracking to build the system, the cost of switching increases relative to other 
approaches. The traceback technology of Traffic Monitoring method has a disadvantage that ISP 
cooperation should be established separately. In the case of SAVA traceback, cooperation with 
other authorities is also required for Inter-AS validation. And a new technology for address 
validation has a lot of work to do for many deployments. For example, all current technologies 
can be applied locally and independently.  
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